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Abstract 
This study analyzes the interplay between cost-sharing and imperfect information 
among online firms competing with offline firms within an industry. By 
incorporating firm level quality, it shows how the intensity of cost-sharing, local 
market size, the number of regions being serviced, and the transport costs affect 
the expected quality of products, the "richness" of the varieties sold in the online 
market and social welfare. One of our results shows that a high intensity of cost- 
sharing, such as costs relating to the warehouse provided by the online platform, 
forces the lowest-quality firms to exit the online market but has no impact on the 
entry of higher-quality firms into the offline market. As a result, the average 
quality of products sold in the online market improves and the product variety 
decreases. Consequently, the welfare remains unchanged. 
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of electronic commerce
by showing how the interplay between imperfect information and cost-sharing among
online rms a¤ects whether rms choose online or o­ ine sales. Building a setting with
the heterogeneous quality of products allows us to investigate how the combination of
imperfect information and cost-sharing among online rms a¤ects welfare.
Electronic commerce has many aspects, as explained in Borenstein and Saloner (2001).
Online sales are characterized by easy access to many types of information, asynchronized
communication, and tailored information. As a result, better matching between con-
sumers and sellers can be achieved, and the costs related to product handling, theft, rents
and selling costs are saved. Furthermore, geographically dispersed o­ ine stores incur in-
ventory costs, whereas online rms may enjoy economies of centralized inventories. The
uncertainty or imperfect information of o­ ine shopping can be considered the primary
shortcoming of purchasing an item from o­ ine rms as all information on the item is not
transmitted perfectly via the internet. However, the consumers often prefer not to wait
for the arrival of an item bought from an online marketplace.
Online sellers outsource many tasks to the selling platform (such as Amazon.com) in
order to avoid the activities for which it is di¢ cult for a single seller to achieve economies
of scale. Thus, online sellers can enjoy more outputs and higher labor productivity as
demonstrated in a study on outsourcing IT (Han, Kau¤man, and Nault, 2011). The
development and operation costs may decrease if a large number of sellers gather in the
platform as Nocke, Peitz, and Sthal (2007) discussed that development costs are shared
equally among platform owners. Hounde, Newberry, and Seim (2017) clarify that the
economies of density works in Amazon.coms delivery network.
We consider rms with heterogeneous product quality to express imperfect information
as well as endogenous xed costs of online rms. The greater the number of users of an
online selling platform, the lower are the xed costs of the rms because of cost-sharing.
To understand these two mechanisms, we do not focus on the search and matching and the
waiting costs associated with online purchases among the characteristics of online sales,
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although Goldmanis, Hortaçsu, Syverson, and Emre (2009) and Williams (2018) analyze
the former, and Loginova (2009) focuses on the latter. In a multiple-region setting, online
rms can share the xed costs as the number of regions increases while o­ ine rms need
to incur the same xed costs when entering each region.
Our papers focus is similar to that of Chen, Hu, and Li (2017). Firms of heterogeneous
quality choose an online or o­ ine market, and then the quality of products is disclosed in
the o­ ine market while remaining hidden in the online market. Furthermore, the higher
xed costs of the o­ ine market corresponds to the cost for disclosing information. The
analytical framework of Chen, Hu, and Li (2017) concerns vertical product di¤erentiation
under oligopolies in the literature of industrial organization. In contrast, our analytical
framework is based on the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, which is
popular in trade, economic growth and the spatial economy. Furthermore, Chen, Hu,
and Li (2017) do not consider the cost sharing among online sellers, but their consumers
do have heterogeneous preference. Consequently, they show that products with very low
quality might be sold in the o­ ine market, whereas our result shows that the lowest
quality products are sold online.
The importance of sensory examination di¤ers among products. Using the results
of consumer survey on clothes, books and digital cameras in online and o­ ine markets,
Gruber (2009) shows that o­ ine (resp. online) channel for clothes (resp. digital cameras)
generally reveals more price dispersion, while books take up a moderate position. Higher
price dispersion could be regarded as an indicator of di¤erentiating with quality or services.
The case extremely relying on sensory examination will be art auction. Kazumori and
McMillan (2005) shows that higher value items are more likely to be sold live than online
auction empirically. Furthermore, they show that the lower valuation uncertainty leads for
sellers to choose online auction theoretically and empirically. The low value uncertainty
can be interpreted as low-quality products. Thus, our model illustrates the market on the
product in which there is a huge gap of information between online and o­ ine markets
like clothes.
Our main ndings are as follows. The impact of cost sharing di¤ers between low and
high-quality rms in the online market. As a result, a larger market benets consumers
3
and embraces fewer rms in the economy and fewer varieties with higher quality in the
online market. Comparing rm with and without an online sales presence, we nd that the
number of o­ ine rms in the case without an online presence is larger than of the case with
an online presence. However, consumers receive the same levels of welfare in both cases
due to the same price indices induced by imperfect information. This result di¤ers from
Brynjolfsson, Smith, and Hu (2003) which estimates that consumer welfare is enhanced
by the increased product variety in the case of online bookstores. Furthermore, without
online rms, the market outcome is the same as the second-best optimum obtained by
choosing the product quality threshold. That is, both the case with two markets and the
case without an online market achieve the same level of social welfare as the second-best
optimum. In a multiple-region setting, rms choose to be online rms, o­ ine domestic
rms and o­ ine exporters according to their quality. We nd that the more integrated
economy provides a higher level of social welfare because of the higher expected quality
of the online market and the smaller number of online rms.
Krautheim (2012) introduces cost sharing in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competi-
tion model for heterogeneous rms, accounting for the xed costs of exporting which, in
turn, decreases with the number of exporters. To determine the number of exporters, the
study assumes that the total number of rms in an industry is xed, and under these
conditions, the entry and exit of rms into an industry is not a¤ected, but we endogenize
total number of rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains a one-region model, showing the
equilibrium, comparative analysis, and the social welfare. Section 3 analyzes a multiple-
region model. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
A country comprises a continuum of rms producing horizontally di¤erentiated products
under the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. We denote the popu-
lation of the country as L. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor, which
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is the only production factor. Without loss of generality, we take labor as the numéraire.
That is, the wage rate w = 1 holds. Thus, the individual income and regional income are,
respectively, given by y = 1 and Y  = yL = L.
2.1.1 Demand
All consumers share the same homothetic preference and the utility function is given by:
U 
Z
!2

'(!)

q(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
; (1)
where 
 is the set of available varieties, '(!) is the product attractiveness or product
quality of variety !, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.
Utility maximization of the representative consumer yields the demand for variety !
given by:
q(!) =
L
P

p(!)='(!)
P
 
; (2)
where the price index is given by
P 
Z
!2

'(!)p(!)1 d!
 1
1 
:
2.1.2 Production
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we assume that rms only exist for a certain
period. There are N potential rms, which operate under increasing returns to scale
with no economies of scope. Thus, each rm produces a single variety and each variety
is produced by a single rm. To produce, a rm needs a marginal requirement c units of
labor. Choosing the unit of each variety, we set c = (   1)=. Prior to entry, rms are
identical and face uncertainty about their quality level '. Entry requires a sunk cost of
Fe units of labor. Once this cost is paid, rms observe their quality index ' 2 (0;+1)
from the common distribution g(') which has positive supports over (0;+1) and has the
cumulative distribution G(').
We assume that there exist two channels for selling: online and o­ ine. Prior to selling
its product, each rm incurs a xed labor requirement. Consumers have perfect infor-
mation about rmsquality index ' through o­ ine shopping, while they have imperfect
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information about the online rms. Specically, consumers have the only information
about the highest quality, ', and the lowest quality, ', in the the online market. For
simplicity, we assume that consumers have an expected value of quality index E', which
is a su¢ cient statistics such that
E' 
Z '
'
'N(')d'; (3)
where ' and ' are, respectively, the lowest and highest quality indices of rms using
online sale; N(') is the conditional density function of g(') on ['; ']. Therefore, the
demand of an online rm ' 2 ['; '] is given by:
qN(') =
L
P

p(')=E'
P
 
: (4)
As there are positive externalities of cost-sharing among online rms, each online rm
incurs a xed labor requirement as follows:
fx = fn
 
x ;   1;
where f is the cost ceiling for online rms and nx > 1 is the mass of available varieties
sold in the online market. Correspondingly, the prot of an online rm ' 2 ['; '] is given
by:
N(') = [pN(')  c]qN(')  fx; (5)
where qN(') is given by (4).
The prot maximization yields an online rm 's optimal price:
pN(') =

   1c = 1: (6)
Substituting (2) and (6) into (5) yields the prot of the online rm ' 2 ['; '] and can be
rewritten as:
N(') =
L

(E')
P1    fx: (7)
Thus, (7) indicates that the prots of all online rms are at the same level regardless of
their types.
Before entering the o­ ine market, each rm must pay a xed requirement of F > f
units of labor. Meanwhile, we assume the iceberg form of transportation costs in the
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o­ ine market: T 2 (1; t) units of a variety should be shipped in order to ensure the
delivery of one unit to a consumer. Correspondingly, the prot of an o­ ine rm ' is
given by:
F (') = [pF (')  c]qF (')  F; (8)
where qF (') is given by (2). The prot maximization yields the o­ ine rm 's optimal
price:
pF (') =

   1c = 1: (9)
Substituting (2) and (9) into (8) provides the demand and prot of the o­ ine rm ':
qF (') = L
'
P1  ; (10)
F (') =
L

'
P1    F:
2.1.3 Zero cuto¤ prot condition
A rm disguise himself in the online market such that the zero cuto¤ prot condition for
an online rm N(') = 0;8' 2 ('; '). Then, the equilibrium expected quality index of
online rms E' is obtained as:
E' =

fxP1 
L
 1

: (11)
The zero cuto¤ prot condition in the o­ ine market F (') = 0 yields the threshold
o­ ine rm 'F , which is the lowest quality index of active o­ ine rms:
'F 

FP1 
L
 1

: (12)
Assuming that fx < F holds, we obtain:
E' < 'F ; (13)
which is the su¢ cient condition for the coexistence of online rms and o­ ine rms.
The indi¤erence between entering the online and o­ ine markets determines the marginal
rm 'I , which is the root to 
F (') = N('). Since N(') = 0;8' 2 ('; '), setting
F (') = N(') = 0 leads to:
L

'I
P1    F =
L

(E')
P1    fx = 0 =) 'I = 'F = ':
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Therefore, rm ' 2 ['; 'F ] chooses to be an online rm and earns zero prot, and rm
' 2 ('F ;+1) chooses to be an o­ ine rm and earns a positive prot. As a result, all
potential rms are active but operate di¤erently due to their market choices.
2.1.4 Aggregation
Equilibrium is characterized by the mass of survival rms N and the distribution of
productivity levels. Since rm ' 2 ['; 'F ] enters the online market, let N(') be the
conditional distribution of g(') on online rms:
N(') =
8<:
g(')
G('F ) G(') if '  '  'F ;
0 otherwise:
(14)
The mass of active rms in the online market nx is given by
nx = N
Z 'F
'
g(')d': (15)
Let F (') be the conditional distribution of g(') on o­ ine rms:
F (') =
8<:
g(')
1 G('F ) if 'F  ' < +1;
0 otherwise:
(16)
The mass of active rms in the o­ ine market no is determined by
no = N
Z +1
'F
g(')d': (17)
Using (14) and (16), the consumer price index is given by
P1   N

(E')
Z 'F
'
g(')d'+
Z +1
'F
'g(')d'

(18)
2.1.5 Free Entry
Free entry of rms is expressed as
Fe =
Z 'F
'
N(')g(')d'+
Z +1
'F
F (')g(')d': (19)
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Since N(') = 0, 8' 2 ('; '), the rst term in the LHS of (19) becomes 0. Thus, (19)
can be written as:
Fe =
Z +1
'F

L'
P1    F

g(')d'.
Although all online rms are indi¤erent between operations and exit, we assume that
online rms are active in o¤ering jobs for workers. Thus, the market-clearing condition
for labor yields:
L
N = Fe +
Z 'F
'
[fx + cq
N(')]g(')d'+
Z 1
'F
[F + cqF (')]g(')d': (20)
Note that the resource constraint a¤ects both online and o­ ine rms.
2.2 Equilibrium
Substituting (6) and (11) into (4) yields the expected demand of online rms:
qN(') = fx: (21)
Combining (12) and (19) yields:
H('F ) 
Z +1
'F

'
'F
  1

g(')d'  Fe
F
= 0: (22)
It is readily veried that H(0) = +1 and H(+1) =  Fe=F < 0 hold. Meanwhile, we
have
@H('F )
@'F
=   
'+1F
Z +1
'F
'g(')d' < 0:
Therefore, there exists a unique solution 'F > 0 in (22). Di¤erent from Melitz (2003),
'F is determined by the free entry condition and the zero cuto¤ condition of only o­ ine
rms because of imperfect information such that N(') = 0;8' 2 ('; ').
Substituting (18) into (12) yields the mass of potential rms given by:
N = L('

F )

F
nhR 'F
'
'g(')d'
i 
G('F ) G(')
1 
+
R +1
'F
'g(')d'
o : (23)
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Combining (3), (11), (12), and (23) yields
M(') 1 +
Z +1
'F
'g(')d'
hR 'F
'
g(')d'
i 1
hR 'F
'
'g(')d'
i
  L
F

F
f
 1

24'F R 'F' g(')d'R 'F
'
'g(')d'
35
( 1)

= 0: (24)
We assume g(') has a heavy tail such that the following inequality holds:
'
Z 'F
'
g(')d'  (   1)
Z 'F
'
'g(')d' > 0: (25)
Under (25), we obtain @M(')=@' > 0. Furthermore, we have lim'!'F M(') = +1. By
dening M(L)  lim'!0M('), it is readily veried that M0(L) < 0 holds. We further
assume that the market size L surpasses a critical level such that:
L > L  I=II; (26)
where
I 1 +
Z +1
'F
'g(')d'
hR 'F
0
g(')d'
i 1
hR 'F
0
'g(')d'
i ;
II  1
F

F
f
 1

"
'F
R 'F
0
g(')d'R 'F
0
'g(')d'
# ( 1)

:
Under (26), we haveM(L) < 0 holds. As a result, (24) has a unique solution ' 2 (0; 'F )
under (25) and (26). Note that ' is determined by a combination of zero cuto¤conditions
of online and o­ ine rms that share the same price index and market size. The prot of
the threshold online rms ' becomes positive ifM(') < 0, otherwise the prot becomes
negative.
Substituting ' and 'F into (3) and (14), we obtain the equilibrium expected quality
index of online rms given by:
(E') =
1
G('F ) G(')
Z 'F
'
'g(')d': (27)
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Substituting 'F into (23) yields the equilibrium mass of potential rms N . Thus, the
equilibrium mass of active rms N is given by:
N = N  1 G(') :
Therefore, (12) yields the price index:
P =

L('F )

F
 1
1 
: (28)
Combining (11) and (28) yields the equilibrium mass of online rms (nx):
nx =

f
F
 1


'F
(E')
 

: (29)
and combining (15) and (17) yields the equilibrium mass of o­ ine rms (no):
no =
R +1
'F
g(')d'R 'F
' g(')d'
nx: (30)
2.3 Comparative analysis
2.3.1 General distribution
We now focus on the impact of market size on the equilibrium. From (22) and (24), we
have:
@'F
@L
= 0;
@'
@L
=   @M('
)=@L
@M(')=@' > 0: (31)
As Melitz (2003) claried, the market size has no impact on the threshold o­ ine rm
'F because the market expansion e¤ect equals to the competition e¤ect for the marginal
rm as the market size increases. However, a larger market size increases the competition
e¤ect more than the market expansion e¤ect for online rms, resulting in an increase in
the threshold quality of online rms ', which di¤ers from the result on the threshold
productivity of rms in Melitz (2003).
The case without cost sharing is expressed by fx = f . Setting  = 0, which means
fx = f , and applying it to (24), we obtain an expression which is equivalent toM(') = 0.
Then, we nd that ' remains unchanged with an increase in market size if cost sharing
is not allowed. That is, each rm does not receive the same benet in the online market.
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Furthermore, (28) implies that @P=@L < 0. In other words, consumers benet from a
larger economy due to a decrease of the price index.
From (27) and (31), we have
d(E')
dL
=
@(E')
@'| {z }
(+)
@'
@L|{z}
(+)
> 0:
A larger market size intensies competition among online rms and increases the threshold
quality of online rms. Thus, the expected quality of online rms increases with the
market size.
Di¤erentiating (29) with respect to L, we have:
dnx
dL
=
@nx
@(E')| {z }
( )
d(E')
dL| {z }
(+)
< 0:
This decrease of nx by an increase in market size leads to an increase of fx, which implies
that the size of online rms are larger in larger region. In Melitz (2003), an increase in xed
costs means a higher zero cuto¤ prot and cuto¤ level. That is, our model is qualitatively
di¤erent from Melitz (2003). Since a larger market size increases the expected quality of
online rms, consumers tend to buy more from each online rm. As a result, online rms
rely less on the cost-sharing mechanism to break even, resulting in a decrease in the mass
of online rms. In other words, online rms mitigate competition by increasing the xed
costs.
Taking the derivative of no with respect to L yields:
dno
dL
=
no
hR 'F
' 'g(')d'
i hR 'F
' g(')d'
i
g(')
"
'
Z 'F
'
g(')d'  (   )
Z 'F
'
'g(')d'
#
> 0:
It is readily veried that @no=@L > 0 holds because of (25) and   1. Combining (27),
(29) and (30), we obtain
dN
dL
=
d (nx + n

o)
dL
< 0;
dN 
dL
=
d
dL

nx + n

o
1 G(')

> 0:
In other words, a larger market size attracts more potential entrants, but causes fewer
rms to survive because of tougher competition.
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Proposition 1 An increase in market size increases competition among rms; thus, con-
sumers benet from the decrease in the price index. Tougher competition among rms due
to cost sharing increases the threshold quality of online rms while keeping the marginal
rm, which is indi¤erent between online and o­ ine markets, unchanged. This results
in a decrease in the mass of online rms and an increase in the mass of o­ ine rms.
Therefore, an increase in market size attracts more potential entrants and causes fewer
rms to survive.
Owing to the exibility of the model, we can explore the impact of the intensity of
cost-sharing  on the equilibrium. From (22) and (24), we have:
@'
@
=   @M('
)
@| {z }
(+)

@M(')
@'
 1
| {z }
( )
> 0:
Meanwhile, combining (22) and (27), we have:
d(E')
d
=
@(E')
@'| {z }
(+)
@'
@|{z}
(+)
> 0: (32)
Thus, the stronger the intensity of cost sharing in the online market, the higher the
threshold quality of online rms and the expected quality index of online rms. This is
due to the tougher competition in the online market. As (22) shows, a change of  has
no impact on 'F . Then, using (32) and (29), we obtain @n

x=@ < 0, which implies that
the fewer number of online rms operate in the presences of a higher intensity of cost-
sharing, owing to the reduction in competition in the online market because we obtain
@fx=@ > 0, which implies that more intensity of cost-sharing leads to the larger size of
online rms. In other words, the intensity of cost-sharing improves the average quality of
products sold in the online market, but causes a decrease in the mass of varieties o¤ered.
Proposition 2 A higher intensity of the cost sharing forces rms of the least quality to
exit from the online market, but has no impact on the entrance of high-quality rms to
the o­ ine market. As a result, the average quality of products sold in the online market
improves, and the number of varieties o¤ered decreases. However, the welfare remains
unchanged.
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2.3.2 Pareto distribution
We now consider a special heavy-tailed distribution to identify the impact of the similarity
of rms. We assume that each rms quality index ' > 1 follows the Pareto distribution
given by:
g(') = ' (+1); (33)
where  >  is the shape parameter. The Pareto distribution o¤ers an advantage in
that the shape parameter  is a measure for the similarity of rms (von Ehrlich and
Seidel, 2013) or an inverse measure of evenness" dened as the similarity between the
probabilities of those di¤erent draws to happen (Ottaviano, 2012). In specic, a high value
of  implies that it becomes less likely to draw a high quality index '. Thus, smaller 
leads to an increase in heterogeneity along the evenness dimension.
Under the Pareto distribution, the su¢ cient condition (25) to @M(')=@' > 0 can be
written by:
(  )[('F )   '] + (   1)' 1('F   ') > 0:
which always holds because of 'F > ' > 1. Meanwhile, (26) can be written by
L > L 
1 + ( 1)

 1( )
[('F )
 1] 1
[('F ) 1 1]
1
F

F
f
 1

n
( 1)[('F ) 1]
[('F ) 1 1]
o( 1)

:
Plugging (33) into (22) yields:
'F =


  
F
Fe
1=
> 1. (34)
and substituting (34) into the price index (28) yields:
P =
"
L
F


  
F
Fe
=# 11 
: (35)
We now turn to the impacts of the similarity of rms  on the equilibrium variables.
From (34), we have
@'F
@

'F
=  

1
   + ln'

F

< 0:
Although the market size has no impact on 'F , an increase in , which implies that the
distribution becomes more concentrated at the lowest level of quality, weakens competition
and results in a low threshold quality of o­ ine rms.
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Next, from (35), we have:
@P
@

P =

   1

1
   + ln'

F

> 0:
An increase in  weakens competition, results in an increase of the price index. Therefore,
consumers su¤er from an increase in the similarity of rms.
2.4 Rethinking the online market
In order to understand the function of the online market, we consider a special case in
which there are only o­ ine rms. Specically, we compare the case of the o­ ine-only
market with the case of online and o­ ine markets.
2.4.1 Equilibrium
In the case of the o­ ine-only market, the o­ ine rm threshold 'NOMF is determined by
(12) with the new price index given by:
(PNOM)1   NNOM
Z +1
'NOMF
'g(')d': (36)
where PNOM and NNOM show the price index and the mass of potential rms in the case
of the o­ ine-only market, respectively.
The free entry condition is the same as (19). Thus, combining (12) and (19) yields
(22), which implies that the threshold quality of o­ ine rm in the case of o­ ine-only
market satises 'NOMF = '

F .
Substituting (36) into (12) yields the equilibrium mass of potential rms without an
online market NNOM given by:
NNOM = L
F
('NOMF )
R +1
'NOMF
'g(')d'
: (37)
Substituting (37) into (36) yields:
(PNOM)1  = L
F
('NOMF )
: (38)
Since 'NOMF = '

F holds, (28) and (38) imply that the two price indices, with and without
the online market, are equal, i.e., PNOM = P holds. On one hand, price index is a
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su¢ cient statistics for the magnitude of competition among rms. Thus, all rms face
the same intensity of competition in both cases. On the other hand, price index is also
an inverse index of indirect utility. From the view of social welfare, the above two cases
have the same market performance.
Combining (23), (24), and (37) yields the relationship between N  and NNOM as
follows:
N  =

1  f
L(nx) 1

NNOM > 0:
Thus, we obtain N  < NNOM. The intuition is as follows: since the threshold quality of
o­ ine rm and the price indices are equal in both cases (i.e., 'NOMF = '

F and '
NOM
F = '

F
hold ), the demands for labor of the o­ ine rm ' > 'F = '
NOM are also equal in both
cases. The market-clearing condition for labor (20) implies that more potential entrants
in the case without online rms. In other words, the reallocation of labor from online
rms to o­ ine rms increases the number of entrants in the case without online rms.
Last but not the least, there exists the following relationship between no and n
NOM
o as
follows:
no  N [1 G('F )] < nNOMo  NNOM[1 G('NOMF )] = NNOM:
In other words, the mass of o­ ine rms in the case without online rms is larger than
that of the case with online rms.
Proposition 3 The case with two kinds of markets has both a greater richness of rm
quality and a smaller mass of potential entrants than those in the case without an online
market, i.e., ' < 'NOMF = '

F and NNOM > N . Thus, the mass of o­ ine rms is
larger in the case without online rms than that of the case with online rms. However,
consumers have the same levels of welfare in both cases due to the same price indices by
imperfect information.
2.4.2 Second-best optimum
We now consider the second-best optimum when there are only o­ ine rms. In this case,
the social planner chooses the optimal threshold quality 'F to maximize the social welfare.
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The timing is as follows. In Step 1, the social planner chooses the optimal threshold
quality. In Step 2, each rm draws its product attractiveness after paying entry costs. The
rms with product quality lower than the optimal threshold exit the market. Otherwise,
rms can choose to produce or quit. In Step 3, each consumer chooses his or her demands
for all available varieties in order to maximize his utility.
We use backward induction to solve the second-best optimum problem. At the rst
stage, in observing prices of all available varieties, the representative consumer maximizes
his or her utility given by (1). Thus, we obtain the demand for variety ! with product
quality '(!) given by (2). At the second stage, facing consumersdemand (2) and the
optimal threshold quality 'SBF  'F 1 chosen by the social planner, rm '  'SBF chooses
its price strategy to maximize prot where 'SBF is the threshold quality of o­ ine rm
chosen as the second-best optimum. Otherwise, rm ' < 'SBF exit from the market.
Prot maximization yields rm 's optimal price given by (9). Accordingly, its prot is
given by (10). Note that each active rm '  'SBF generates a nonnegative prot.
At the third stage, the welfare maximization problem of the social planner is described
by as follows:
'SBF = arg max
'F'F
P1   N
Z +1
'F
'g(')d'; (39)
The social planner has a resource constraint, which is equivalent to the market-clearing
condition for labor given by:
L
N = Fe +
Z +1
'F
[F + cqF (')]g(')d': (40)
Substituting (40) into (39), the welfare maximization problem can be written by
'SBF = arg max
'F'F
P1  = 1

L
R +1
'F
'g(')d'
Fe + F
R1
'F
g(')d'
: (41)
Thus, the FOC of welfare maximization (41) is obtained as:
@P1 
@'F
=   1

Lg('F )
Fe + F
R1
'F
g(')d'
"
'F  
F
R +1
'F
'g(')d'
Fe + F
R1
'F
g(')d'
#
= 0: (42)
1The optimal threshold quality 'SBF should be no less than the equilibrium threshold quality '

F , i.e.,
'SBF  'F . Otherwise, 'SBF will never be binding.
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Note that (42) is equivalent to (22), which implies 'SBF = '

F . Meanwhile, the SOC of
welfare maximization (41) is given by:
@2P1 
@'2F

'F!'SBF ='F
=   ('

F )
 1 g('F )L
Fe + F
R1
'F
g(')d'
< 0:
Since the resource constraint (40) is the same as the market-clearing condition when there
is only an o­ ine market, the mass of potential entrants in the second-best optimum N SB
is the same as N . Accordingly, the free entry condition (19) holds in the second-best
optimum. Therefore, the market outcome is the same as the second-best optimum when
there is only an o­ ine market.
Proposition 4 If there are only o­ ine rms, the market outcome is the same as the
second-best optimum. Furthermore, both the case with two markets and the case without
an online market achieve the same level of social welfare as the second-best optimum.
3 Multiple Regions
3.1 Setup
We now consider that the economy consists of a number of symmetric regions indexed
by r = 1; 2; :::; R. Consumers in each region share the same homothetic preferences given
by (1). We assume that each region is endowed with L population that supplies L units
of labor inelastically. Without loss of generality, we take labor in a region as numéraire.
The symmetricity implies that the equilibrium wage rates in any two di¤erent regions are
equal, i.e., wr = ws = 1, 8r, 8s 6= r holds.
Firm heterogeneity, Gr('), takes the same form among all regions such that Gr(') =
G('), 8r. After paying the same sunk entry costs (Fe;r = Fe, 8r), a rm in region r draws
its quality index ' from the cumulative distribution G('). To provide a certain variety
to region s, an o­ ine rm in region r needs to incur F units of the xed requirement
of labor and c = (   1)= units of the marginal requirement of labor. In other words,
F units of labor are required as an entry cost for an o­ ine rm to sell its product to a
region. In contrast, all online rms in the economy benet from the unied online market
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and can access to all regions after paying the one-time xed requirement fx. The xed
requirement of an online rm is given as follows:
fx = f
 
RX
r=1
nx;r
! 
= f(Rnx)
 : (43)
where nx;r is the mass of online rms in region r. As in Samuelson (1954) and in common
with studies in New Economic Geography, the same iceberg transport costs exist among
any two regions. In specic,  > 1 units of goods must be shipped from region r in order
to ensure delivery of one unit to region s 6= r.
Prot maximization, respectively, yields the consumer prices in region r and s 6= r of
an online or o­ ine rm ' located in region r:
prr(') =

   1c = 1; prs(') =

   1c =  :
Owing to the unied online market, there are no further xed costs required for online
rms to meet the demand of interregional consumers. Thus, each active online rm will
serve consumers in all regions. The prot of online rm ' 2 ['; 'F ) is given by
N(') =
L

[1 + (R  1)] (E')
P1    fx;
where    1  2 (0; 1) represent the degree of trade freeness. Thus, the zero cuto¤prot
condition of online rms yields:
E' =

fxP1 
L [1 + (R  1)]
 1

: (44)
While, each o­ ine rm in region r needs to pay an extra xed entry cost of F units
of labor to serve the consumers in region s 6= r. Thus, there exists a gap between the
operating prot of the home market, Fd ('), and that of an external market, 
F
t ('), for
o­ ine rm ' > 'F as follows:
Fd (') 
rFd (')

  F > Ft (')  
rFd (')

  F;
where rFd (') is the revenue of o­ ine rm ' > 'F from the home market and 
F
d ('F ) = 0
holds. Thus, a threshold exporting o­ ine rm 'X(> 'F ) earns zero operating prot from
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an external market , i.e., Ft ('X) = 0 holds. Thus, the operating prot of o­ ine rm
' 2 ('F ; 'X), who only serves its home market, is given by:
F (') = Fd (') 
L'
P1    F:
The zero cuto¤ prot condition of o­ ine rm 'F yields (12). It is readily veried that
Ft ('X) = 0 yields the threshold exporting o­ ine rm 'X given by
'X =

FP1 
L
 1

: (45)
Note that, using (12) and (45), we obtain
'X = e'F ; (46)
where e   1 1= =  1=. Therefore, rm ' < ' is inactive; rm ' 2 ['; 'F ) chooses to
be an online rm and earns zero prot; rm ' 2 ['F ; 'X) chooses to be an o­ ine rm
serving only its home market and earns positive prot; and rm '  'X chooses to be
an o­ ine rm serving all regions and earns a large positive prot. Thus, the operating
prot of o­ ine rm '  'X , who serves both home and external markets, is given by
F (') = Fd (') + (R  1)Ft (') =
L

[1 + (R  1)]'
P1   RF:
As a result, the conditional distribution of g(') on online rms, N('), is given by (14),
and the conditional distribution of g(') on o­ ine rms serving only home market, d('),
is given by
d(') =
8<:
g(')
G('X) G('F ) if 'F  ' < 'X ;
0 otherwise;
and the conditional distribution of g(') on o­ ine rms serving all regions, T ('), is given
by
t(') =
8<:
g(')
1 G('X) if 'X  ' < +1;
0 otherwise:
The mass of active rms in the online market nx is the same as (15). The mass of active
o­ ine rms who serves only their home markets, nd, and those who serves both home
and external markets, nt, are, respectively, given by:
nd = N
Z 'X
'F
g(')d'; nt = N
Z +1
'X
g(')d':
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The price index is now rewritten as:
P 
(
[1 + (R  1)]N

(E')
Z 'F
'
g(')d'+
Z +1
'X
'g(')d'

+N
Z 'X
'F
'g(')d'
) 1
1 
:
(47)
Free entry condition yields:
Fe =
Z +1
'F
Fd (')g(')d'+ (R  1)
Z +1
'X
Ft (')g(')d': (48)
and the market-clearing condition for labor can be rewritten as:
L
N =Fe +
Z 'F
'

fx + c[q
N
rr(') + (R  1)qNrs(') ]
	
g(')d'
+
Z +1
'F
[F + cqFrr(')]g(')d'+ (R  1)
Z +1
'X
[F + cqFrs(') ]g(')d': (49)
3.2 Equilibrium
Substituting (46) into (48) yields:
HM('F ) 
Z +1
'F

'
'F
  1

g(')d'+ (R  1)
Z +1
e'F

'
'F
  1

g(')d'  Fe
F
= 0: (50)
It is readily veried that HM(0) = +1, HM(+1) =  Fe=F < 0, and
@HM('F )
@'F
=   
'+1F
Z +1
'F
'g(')d'  (R  1)
'+1F
Z +1
e'F '
g(')d' < 0:
hold. Therefore, there exists a unique solution 'F > 0 to (50). Thus, we obtain '

X =e'F > 'F because of (46).
Substituting (44) and (46) into (47) yields the mass of potential rms given by
N = L
F
('F )

[1 + (R  1)]

(E')
R 'F
'
g(')d'+
R +1
'X
'g(')d'

+
R 'X
'F
'g(')d'
: (51)
Combining (3), (12), (43), (44), and (51) yields
MM(')  1 + (R  1)  LR
F

F
f
[1 + (R  1)]
1= 24'F R 'F' g(')d'R 'F
'
'g(')d'
35
( 1)

+
"
(R  1)
Z +1
e'F '
g(')d'+
Z +1
'F
'g(')d'
# hR 'F
'
g(')d'
i 1
hR 'F
'
'g(')d'
i = 0: (52)
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We assume g(') has a heavy tail such that (25) holds. Under (25), we obtain @MM(')=@' >
0. Furthermore, we have lim'!'F MM(') = +1. By deningMM(L)  lim'!0MM('),
it is readily veried that M0M(L) < 0 holds. We further assume that the market size L
surpasses a critical level such that
L > LR  IM=IIM ; (53)
where
IM 1 + (R  1) +
"
(R  1)
Z +1
e'F '
g(')d'+
Z +1
'F
'g(')d'
# hR 'F
0
g(')d'
i 1
hR 'F
0
'g(')d'
i ;
IIM  R
F

F
f
[1 + (R  1)]
1= "'F R 'F0 g(')d'R 'F
0
'g(')d'
# ( 1)

:
Under (53), we conrm that MM(L) < 0 holds. As a result, equationMM(') = 0 has a
unique root ' 2 (0; 'F ) under (25) and (53).
Meanwhile, because (12) is the same as the single region case, the equilibrium expected
quality index of online rm (E') and the price index P are, respectively, given by (27)
and (28). Thus, combining (44) and (28) yields the equilibrium mass of online rms (nx)
given by:
nx =
1
R

f
[1 + (R  1)]F
 1


'F
(E')
 

: (54)
Finally, the equilibrium mass of o­ ine rms serving only the home market, nd, and the
equilibrium mass of o­ ine rms serving all regions, nt , are,respectively, obtained as:
nd =
G('X) G('F )
G('F ) G(')
nx; n

t =
1 G('X)
G('F ) G(')
nx:
3.3 Comparative analysis
From (50), we have:
@HM('F )
@
= (R  1)
Z +1
e'F
'
('F )
g(')d' > 0:
and the implicit function theorem yields:
@'F
@
=  
@HM ('F )
@
@HM ('F )
@'F
> 0: (55)
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Thus, increasing trade openness leads to a larger 'F .
Substituting 'F = e 1'X into (50), we obtain
HM('X) 
Z +1
'X=e

'
('X)
  1

g(')d'+ (R  1)
Z +1
'X

'
('X)
  1

g(')d'  Fe
F
= 0:
and
@HM('X)
@'X
=   
('X)+1
Z +1
'X=e '
g(')d'  (R  1) 
('X)+1
Z +1
'X
'g(')d' < 0
@HM('X)
@
=   1
2('X)
Z +1
'X=e '
g(')d' < 0;
which implies that @'X=@ < 0. In other words, both online and o­ ine rms who sell
their products to external regions benet from the decrease in transport costs. As a result,
o­ ine rms who serve only their home market su¤er from the more integrated economy,
resulting in an increase of 'F and a decrease of '

X .
Due to the cumbersome expression, we can only explore the impact of trade freeness
on the threshold online rm ' in the case of  = 1. As we obtained in the one-region
model, it is readily veried that @'=@ > 0. Thus, the impact on ' which we show
below will be magnied in the case of  > 1. Setting  = 1 in (52) and using (55) yields
dMM(')
d

=1
=
@MM(')
@

=1| {z }
( )
+
@MM(')
@'F

=1| {z }
( )
@'F
@

=1| {z }
(+)
< 0:2
Thus, we obtain
@'
@

=1
=   dMM('
)
d

=1| {z }
( )
26664@MM(')@'

=1| {z }
(+)
37775
 1
> 0:
The more integrated economy intensies the competition among online rms and also
improves the market access to external regions. The former dominates the latter, resulting
in an increase of the threshold online rm '. Meanwhile, an increase of ' and 'F leads
2It is readily veried that
@MM (')
@

=1
< 0 and
@MM (')
@'F

=1
< 0 hold when L is su¢ ciently large
such that L < LM  fR
8<:1 + R +1e'F 'g(')d'
R 'F
' g(')d'
 1
R '
F
' 'g(')d'

9=; holds.
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to an increase in the expected quality of online rms (E') in a more integrated economy,
i.e., @(E')=@ > 0 holds.
We now further consider the impact of the number of regions on the equilibrium. It
is readily veried that @HM('F )=@R > 0 and @HM('X)=@R > 0 hold. Thus, we can
obtain @'F=@R > 0 and @'

X=@R > 0. The impact of becoming more integrated ( "
) on the threshold quality of exporting o­ ine rm 'X is di¤erent from the impact of
accessing to more external markets (R " ). The intuition behind this is as follows: when
a region accesses to more external markets, the exporting o­ ine rm benets from the
improvement of market potential and su¤ers from more competition from external regions.
The former is dominated by the latter, resulting in an increase of the threshold exporting
o­ ine rms 'X . Similarly, it is readily veried that @'
=@R > 0 holds when  = 1. Thus,
the threshold online rm ' increases when the number of regions increases. Through
simple calculations, we can obtain that @(E')=@R > 0 holds. Therefore, the expected
quality of online rms increases when a region accesses to more external regions.
Finally, combining @'F=@ > 0, @'

F=@R > 0, and (28) yields dP=d < 0 and
dP=dR < 0. Thus, lowering transport costs and/or increasing the number of regions
lead to a decrease in the price index and improves the social welfare. Using (44), and
dP=d < 0, @(E')=@ > 0, dP=dR < 0, @(E')=@R > 0, we obtain @nx=@ < 0 and
@nx=@R < 0. Thus, using (43) leads to @f

x=@ > 0 and @f

x=@R > 0. That is, the more
integrated and/or the larger number of regions, the higher the average quality of products
and the less mass of varieties in the online market. Meanwhile, fewer varieties lead to
higher xed costs, which result in a larger threshold quality of online rms and also a
smaller number but the larger size of online rms.
Proposition 5 As the economy is more integrated and/or the number of regions in-
creases, both the threshold online rm ' and the threshold domestic o­ ine rm 'F
increases, resulting in an increase in the expected quality of active online rms E' and a
smaller number of online rms nx. Meanwhile, a more integrated economy decreases the
threshold exporting o­ ine rm 'X . An increase of the number of regions leads to a hike
of the threshold exporting o­ ine rm 'X . All in all, the price index decreases and thus
the social welfare increases when the economy is more integrated and/or the number of
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regions increases.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the interplay between the cost-sharing and imperfect information
among online rms which compete with o­ ine rms within an industry. Our analysis
claries the impact of improving electronic commerce platforms on the economy. We nd
that the improvement and the existence of the online rms do not a¤ect social welfare, but
the existence of the online market reduces the number of o­ ine rms, which may show
that a policy to mitigate the immediate change of the size of o­ ine rms are needed. We
also nd that the improvement by the platform to intensify cost-sharing provide a higher
level of expected quality in the online market but also results in a smaller number and
larger size of online rms. This is because the impact of the cost-sharing on an online
rm di¤ers among online rms with di¤erent quality.
A key issue for further consideration is how to protect consumers in the online market
and ensure a fair competitive environment for rms. Thus, additional analysis on the
online market and between online and o­ ine rms is needed in future studies.
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